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The following article summarizes selected developments during 2011 in the regulation
of international securities and capital markets in Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, Ger-
many, Japan, and Peru)
1. Australia**
A. AUSTRALIAN ExEcUIIVE REMUNERATION REFORM-THE "Two STRIKES RULE"
The introduction of the "two strikes rule"2 changed the dynamic between the board of
directors and shareholders in relation to the determination of executive remuneration.
Before this reform, the landscape in Australia centered on a "non-binding vote" system,
which was introduced in 2004-2005. 3 Under the prior system, the board would set remu-
neration and policy, but all listed companies were required to include a resolution at their
annual general meeting (AGV) in relation to the adoption of the company's remuneration
* Thomas M. Britt I, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP (Hong Kong SAR, China) served as the committee
editor. Jeremy Davis, James Rozsa, and Deepti Sutrave, Corrs Chambers Westgarth, contributed Australia's
developments, Walter Douglas Stuber and Adriana Maria Gddel Stuber, Walter Stuber Consultoria Jurfdica
(Sgo Paulo), contributed Brazil's developments, Dr. Manfred Ketzer, Hausmaninger Kletter Rechtsanwllte
GmbH, (Vienna, Austria) and Christopher Bernard contributed Part A of EU's developments, Christopher
Bernard contributed Part B of EU developments, Dr. Hartmut Krause, Allen & Overy LLP (Frankfurt,
Germany), contributed Germany's developments, Piyasena C. Perera, Anderson Moi & Tomotsune,
contributed Japan's and China's development, Jean Paul Chabaneix, Rodrigo, Elias & Medrano Abogados
contributed Peru's development.
1. For developments in selected jurisdictions during 2010, see Jodo Otivio Pinheiro Olivio et al., inter-
national Securities and Capital Markets, 45 IrT'L LAW. 253 (2011). For developments during 2009, see Walter
Stuber et al., 44 INT'L LAW. 301 (2010).
** By Jeremy Davis, James Rozsa and Deepti Sutrave, Corrs Chambers Westgarth.
2. Corporations Amendment (Improving Accountability on Director and Executive Remuneration) Act 2011 (Cth)
(Ausd.) [hereinafter Eecutive Remuneration Act].
3. See Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (Cth)
(Austl.).
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report4 (a report that identifies key executives' remuneration and the remuneration policy
as set by the board).5 The vote on the resolution was non-binding.6 Accordingly, ulti-
mate power in determining executive remuneration remained with the board, not the
shareholders.
The effectiveness of the "non-binding vote" system was evaluated by the Australian
government's Productivity Commission Report. 7 The report found that the "non-binding
vote" generally encouraged engagement on remuneration between companies and share-
holders, and that boards were sensitive to votes against the remuneration report.8 But
some boards failed to take any action despite consecutive years of significant "no" votes9
and, as a result, the Productivity Commission recommended the "two strikes rule." l0
That rule is now the law.1'
In short, the "two strikes rule" works as follows:
* At each AGM, shareholders must vote on the adoption of the remuneration re-
port (strike resolution); and
* if, at any AGM, at least twenty-five percent of the votes cast on the strike resolu-
tion are "no" votes; and
" at the subsequent AGM (second AGM), at least twenty-five percent of the votes
cast on the strike resolution are "no" votes; then,
" a resolution to hold a shareholders meeting to replace the entire board other than
the CEO (spill resolution) must be put to shareholders at the second AGM. If at
least fifty percent of the votes cast on the spill resolution are "yes" votes; then,
• a shareholders meeting to replace the board (spill meeting) must be held within
ninety days of the second AGM, at which the directors (other than the CEO)
must stand for re-election.' 2
Although in its early stages, a number of criticisms have been made against the "two
strikes rule," including that the rule will lead to additional compliance costs and could be
used for ulterior purposes (for example, board destabilization in the context of a potential
control transaction). A more significant criticism is that the threshold for triggering a
board re-election is too low, particularly given the low shareholder turnout rate at
AGMs,13 and that key executives and directors and their associated parties are excluded
from voting on the strike and spill resolutions but not the spill meeting.14 As such, a few
4. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 250R(2) (Ausri.) [hereinafter Corporations Act].
5. Id. s 300A.
6. Id. s 250R(3).
7. Productivity Commission 2009, Executive Remuneration in Australia, Report N. 49, Final Inquiry Re-
port, Melbourne [hereinafter PC Report].
8. Id. at 281. This sensitivity was displayed by many corporations that amended their remuneration ar-
rangements in response to "no" votes. These corporations include: Wesfarmers (2008-2009), Boral
(2008-2009), Suncorp-Metway (2008-2009), Toll (2008-2009), Telstra (2007-2008). Id.
9. Id. at 297. Companies that failed to take action include: Crane Group (2007-2010), Qantas
(2008-2009), Transurban (2008-2010). Id.
10. See id. at 329 (Recommendation 15).
11. Executive Remuneration Act 2011, (Cth) ss 9, 13 (Austl.).
12. Corporations Act 2001, (Cth) ss 250U-250W (Ausd.).
13. See PC Report, supra note 7, at 302. In 2008, voting participation in ASX200 companies averaged 54%
on remuneration report resolutions (thereby only requiring 13.5% of shareholders to action a strike resolu-
tion). Id. at 301.
14. Corporations Act, s 250R(4).
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minority shareholders could force a board re-election process, even in circumstances
where there is a very low prospect of the existing board not being re-elected. For exam-
ple, in a company where a chairman controls 50.1% of voting shares, the chairman would
be unable to vote on the strike or spill resolutions, which makes it easier for a few minority
shareholders to force a board re-election. But there would be little or no risk of a board
spill as the chairman could vote on the board re-election resolutions. One reform we have
recommended is to allow key executives and directors to vote on the spill resolution,
bringing the voting rules into line with the spill meeting rules and thereby avoiding the
distraction and cost of a redundant shareholder meeting.
Following the 2011 AGM season, there are a number of companies that have received
their first "strike"15; however, the true impact of the reforms will only be seen following
the 2012 AGM season.
II. Brazil*
A. THE NEW RULES FOR AUTONOMOUS INVESTMENT AGENTS i BRAZIL
By means of CVM Instruction No. 497 of June 3, 2011, the Brazilian Securities and
Exchange Commission (Comissdo de ValoresMobilidrios - CVM) issued new rules that apply
to the autonomous investment agents, effective January 1, 2012.16 The main objective of
the new regulation is to make the role of the autonomous investment agent more trans-
parent due to the expansion of the Brazilian capital markets. The autonomous investment
agent remains as a distributor of products to service intermediaries.
The definition of the activities permitted to these agents crystallizes the solutions con-
sidered most appropriate for dealing with problems, by listing the prohibitions applied to
the activity and presenting a framework of obligations and responsibilities to the market
participants. All these changes aim at reducing possible fields of uncertainty for clients,
mainly through the strengthening of the liability of intermediaries for the action of the
autonomous investment agents and through the enhancement of the control mechanisms.
The autonomous investment agents are characterized as "extensions of the securities bro-
kers" as they represent centers of securities distribution, often located in distant regions of
the country. In summary, the new regulation contemplates, among other measures, the
following:
(i) A clearer definition of the contents of the autonomous investment agents' activities,
previously generically referred to as "distribution and mediation of securities" under the
responsibility of the intermediary. Such a definition makes the acts involved in the distri-
bution of securities safer.
(ii) The mandatory adoption of certain practices to monitor the performance of the
autonomous investment agents and its own clients by institutions of the Brazilian securi-
15. Austock Group, BlueScope Steel, Cabcharge Australia, Globe International, News Corporation, Per-
petual, Sirtex Medical, Tassal Group and UGL have received their first "strike." Ted Allen, Twelve Austrailian
Companies Receive First Strike Votes, ISS GOVERNANCE (Nov. 18, 2011 4:32 PM), http://blog.issgovernance.
com/gov/2011/1 I/twelve-australian-companies-receive-first-strike-votes.html.
* By Walter Douglas Stuber and Adriana Maria G6del Stuber, Walter Stuber Consultoria Jurfdica.
16. See Decreto No. 497, de 3 de Junho de 2011, Dirio Oficial da Unido [D.O.U], de 1.1.2012 (Braz.),
available at http://www.cvm.gov.br.
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ties distribution system, as well as the implementation of control mechanisms that are
more appropriate to the new market reality.
(iii) The obligation of exclusive contractual relationship with an intermediary (with one
exception that is outlined below), in view of the activities carried out by the autonomous
investment agents and the risks entailed. Thus, the activities under the responsibility of a
certain intermediary are more easily subject to control mechanisms and the intermediary
will have to comply with its duty of supervision.
(iv) A new framework for accreditation and registration of autonomous investment
agents to be implemented by a private entity subject to the authorization and supervision
of CVM (the licensing authority), with the adoption of mechanisms for certification and
continuing education. This new structure is intended to give greater agility to the
processes of accreditation and cancellation of autonomous investment agents, still improv-
ing the system of access to this activity. CVM included an exhaustive list of the activities
permitted to the autonomous investment agents, which are now limited to three levels: (i)
prospecting and client acquisition, (ii) receiving, recording, and transmission of orders,
and (iii) providing information on products and services of an intermediary (securities
broker) to which the agent is bound.
Only individuals (natural persons) may act as autonomous investment agents. But the
new regulation permits the formation of a legal entity or sole proprietorship for the provi-
sion of services, provided that only accredited agents are holders of the company's capital
stock. This is a prerogative to be exercised exclusively for tax purposes and confirms the
burden of personhood activity attributed by CVM to the autonomous investment agents
and strengthens the accountability mechanisms of the agents' liability. To carry out the
activities of portfolio management, consulting, or analysis of securities, the autonomous
investment agent that is registered by CVM for the performance of those activities under
the regulations in force shall apply to the licensing authority to suspend its accreditatioi as
an autonomous investment agent. The autonomous investment agent that maintains a
contract with an intermediary through a legal entity or sole proprietorship, as permitted in
the new regulation, cannot be engaged directly by another intermediary. The great inno-
vation introduced by CVM is the exclusivity of the autonomous investment agent to a
single intermediary.
The new regulation stresses the responsibility of the securities brokers with clients and
third parties for the acts committed by the autonomous investment agents linked to them.
In this regard, it reaffirms the understanding that the prospective clients originated by the
autonomous investment agents are the responsibility of the securities brokers as if they
were prospected by their own employees. Measures such as approval and control of
materials used by the autonomous investment agents, routine check of recordings and
broadcasts of orders, monitoring the relationship between the autonomous investment
agents and their networks of contacts, and monitoring of clients operations, among others,
will be part of the agenda of the securities brokers as a way of managing the risks inherent
in outsourcing. With such regulation, CVM seeks to improve the rules for autonomous
investment agents, recognizes their importance in the popularization of the capital mar-
ket, and makes use of a liability structure compatible with the extension of the client base
of securities brokers.
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M. European Union
A. MOST IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES OF THE EU GOVERNING BODIES**
As in the previous years, the European Union reacted to the challenges of the financial
markets with a review of existing legal provisions and the publication of proposals for
future directives and regulations.
1. Proposal Regarding Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (i.e. market abuse)
On October 20, 2011, the European Commission published a proposal for a Directive
on criminal sanctions for insider dealing and market manipulation, 17 together with a pro-
posal for a Regulation on insider dealing and market manipulation.' 8 The Commission
considers the current sanctions for market abuse in the EU Member States as not suffi-
cient and heterogeneous. A level playing field can only be obtained if all Member States
provide for criminal sanctions for market abuse. Currently, some states only impose ad-
ministrative (monetary) sanctions that, in the opinion of the Commission, 19 are insuffi-
ciently dissuasive. Twenty-four months after entry into force of this Directive, EU
Member States will be required to regard insider dealing 2° and market manipulation 2' as
criminal offences if committed intentionally. The attempt should also be punishable as a
criminal offense. 22
The proposed Regulation is designed to extend its scope by also covering financial in-
struments admitted to trading not only on a regulated market but also on a multilateral
trading facility (MTF) or an organized trading facility (OTF), as well as to any related
financial instruments traded over the counter (OTC) that can have an effect on the cov-
ered underlying market. The Regulation will further apply to commodity derivatives and
the related spot commodity contracts as well as emission allowances. 23 Some high fre-
quency trading strategies are considered as market manipulation (e.g., "quote stuffing").24
Finally, regulators shall have more efficient investigative and sanctioning powers. 25
** By Dr. Manfred Ketzer, Hausmaninger Ketter Rechtsanwalte GmbH, Vienna, Austria.
17. See Commission Proposalfor a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on Criminal Sanctions for
Insider Dealing and Marker Manipulation, COM (2011) 654 final (Oct. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Directive], availa-
ble at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0654:FIN:EN:PDF.
18. See Commission Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider Dealing and
Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), COM (2011) 651 final (Oct. 22, 2011), [hereinafter Regulation], available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:065 1:FIN:EN:PDF.
19. Id. at 2 (quoting Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision, 23 (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://ec.europa.edu/international-market/finances/docs/de-larosiere-report-en.pd.
20. Directive, supra note 17, art. 3.
21. Id. art. 4.
22. Id. art. 5.
23. Regulation, supra note 18, art. 2.
24. Id. art. 8.
25. Id. art. 17.
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2. Proposal Regarding Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID)
On October 20, 2011, the Commission published proposals for a Directive on markets
in financial instruments, repealing Directive 2004/39/EC,26 and for a Regulation on mar-
kets in financial instruments, and amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC derivatives, cen-
tral counterparties, and trade repositories.2 7
One major goal of the proposed rules is to provide a level playing field for financial
instruments. To this end, all organized trading shall be conducted on regulated trading
venues, which shall encompass regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTFs),
and organized trading facilities (OTFs). Identical pre- and post-trade transparency re-
quirements shall apply to all of these venues.
The level of information for potential investors and clients shall be increased. As a
consequence, transparency rules applicable to shares shall also apply to equity-like instru-
ments such as depository receipts, exchange-traded funds, certificates, and other similar
financial instruments issued by companies. Similar rules shall cover bonds, structured fi-
nance products, emission allowances, and derivatives. The proposed Directive also in-
cludes new rules on improved corporate governance and on enhanced organizational
requirements of an investment firm. Emissions allowances will be added to the definition
of financial instruments covered by MiFID.
3. Proposals on Credit Rating Agencies
On November 15, 2011, the EU Commission published a set of proposals to curb the
influence of Credit Rating Agencies (CRA) and to increase the regulation of their con-
duct.2s Investment funds and alternative investment funds shall not solely or mechanisti-
cally rely on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of the assets.
External credit ratings may be used as one factor among others in this process but shall
not prevail.
Issuers of structured finance instruments shall be required to engage two credit rating
agencies, independent from each other, to issue two independent credit ratings in parallel.
CRAs shall be prohibited from rating major shareholders or entities/financial instruments
the CRA has a significant interest in. Lead rating analysts should not be involved in rating
the same entity for more than four years. In addition, CRAs should submit the proposed
methodologies to ESMA for the assessment of their compliance with existing require-
26. Council Directive 2004/39/EC, 2004, OJ. (L145) 1 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0656:FIN:EN:PDF.
27. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on markets in Financial Instruments
and Amending Regulation [EMIR] on OTC Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, COM
(2011) 652 final (Oct. 20, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2011:0652:FIN:EN:PDF.
28. Directive 2009/65/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive on the Coordination
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings of Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in Respect of the Excessive
Reliance on Credit Ratings, COM (2011) 746 final (Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal-
market/securities/docs/agencies/COM 2011_746_en.pdf; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies, COM (2011) 746 final
(Nov. 15, 2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/securities/docs/agencies/COM-2011-747-
en.pdf.
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ments. In relation to sovereign ratings, CRAs shall assess ratings every six months (instead
of twelve months) and have to provide a full research report when issuing and amending
sovereign ratings, to improve transparency and enhance users' understanding.
B. NEW RISK RETENTION AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS FOR EUROPEAN
SECURTIZATION*
The year 2011 was another challenging year for the securitization markets in Europe.
Although the amount of new issuance in the first six months of the year almost doubled
compared to the same period in 2010, the majority of this was retained on the balance
sheets of the originators or sponsors to secure central bank funding.29 The amount actu-
ally placed with third-party investors remained far below the peak of 2006.30 Meanwhile,
market participants grappled with the new risk retention and other provisions of Article
122a of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), while regulators continued to refine
new capital requirements for banks, insurers, and pension funds that have securitization
exposures.
1. Article 122a
Article 122a of the CRD came into effect for new securitizations on January 1, 2011.31
Adopted in 2009 by the European Commission (EC) as part of the amendments known as
"CRD2," Article 122a provides that European credit institutions may only invest in or
otherwise be exposed to the credit risk of securitizations if the originator, sponsor, or
original lender retains at least five percent of the risk. Article 122a also imposes due
diligence, disclosure, and monitoring requirements on those credit institutions.
On December 31, 2010, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) pub-
lished guidelines on the application of Article 122a. 32 Nevertheless, a number of ques-
tions have arisen regarding how the new requirements should be applied in practice. The
European Banking Authority (EBA), which replaced the CEBS at the beginning of the
year, published a Q&A paper on September 29, 2011, with answers to some of these
questions. 33 This document provides interpretive guidance on specific paragraphs of Arti-
cle 122a and the guidelines, as well as clarifications regarding the application of the rules
* By Christopher Bernard.
29. See ASSOCIATION FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS IN EUROPE, AFME/ESF SECURITISATION DATA REPORT
Q2:2011 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.afme.eu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5627.
30. Id. See also Hans J. Blommestein, et al., Outlook for the Securitisation Market, OECD J: FYN. MARKET
TRENDS, no. 1, at 4, available at htp://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/44/48620405.pdf.
31. Directive 2009/111/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of September 16, 2009,
Amending Directives 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as Regards Banks Affiliated to Central In-
stitutions, Certain Own Funds Items, Large Exposures, Supervisory Arrangements, and Crisis Management,
2009 O.J. (L 302/97) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.douri=OJ:L:2009:302:
0097:0119:EN:PDF.
32. See Guidelines to Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive, COMMITTEE OF EUROPEAN BANKING
SUPERVISORS (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Standards%20and%20
Guidelines/2010/Application%20of%/o2OArt.%20122a%20of%/ 2othe%20CRD/Guidelines.pdf.
33. See Q&A on Guidelines to Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive, COMMITTEE OF EURO-
PEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Standards
%20and%2OGuidelines/2011 /EBA-BS-2011-126-revl (QA-on-guidelines-Arttl 22a).pdf.
SPRING 2012
272 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
to asset-backed commercial paper conduits, correlation trading, and managed collateral-
ized loan obligations.
Significantly, the Q&A paper states that participants must look to the "economic sub-
stance" of a transaction to determine whether it constitutes a securitization for purposes of
Article 122a.34 This approach, together with some of the EBA's answers regarding the
level of disclosure and due diligence that may be required in certain circumstances, pro-
vides a degree of flexibility but perpetuates some uncertainty as well. A consensus regard-
ing these and other points should emerge as market practice develops into 2012.
2. Capital Requirements
In addition to CRD2, the EC in December 2010 published further amendments to the
CRD (CRD3) that will introduce higher capital requirements for re-securitization expo-
sures and for securitization positions held in the trading book.35 CRD3 also requires a
bank to treat a securitization position as unrated, thus increasing its capital charge, if the
credit assessment is based in whole or in part on unfunded support provided by the bank
itself, and enhances disclosure requirements. 36 Member States must implement CRD3 by
December 31, 2011. 37
Discussions continued in 2011 regarding the implementing measures for Solvency II,
the new regulatory regime for insurers in the European Union, which is currently sched-
uled to be effective by January 1, 2014.38 Solvency II will impose higher capital charges
on asset-backed securities for insurers and pension funds compared to other investments,
such as covered bonds, which could put securitizations at a disadvantage. The European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority announced that it intends to finalize its
proposals in September 2012. 39
Finally, the EC published a legislative proposal for further revisions to the CRD on July
20, 2011.40 Known as "CRD4," the new amendments will translate the Basel I1 frame-
34. Id. § I.
35. See Directive 2010/76/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 24, 2010,
Amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as Regards Capital Requirements for
the Trading Book and for Re-securitizations, and the Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies, 2010




38. See Directive 2009/138/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 25, 2009 on
the Taking-up and Pursuit of the Business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency 11) (recast), 2009 O.J. (L
335/1) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:0001:0155:EN:
PDF; see also Press Release, European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority, First EIOPA Confer-
ence Attracts 350 Participants - EIOPA Provides Update on Work on Solvency 11 (Nov. 16, 2011), https://
eiopa.europa.eu/fileadmin/tx dam/files/Press-Room/AnnualConference-SolII-Update.pdf [hereinafter
EIOPA Press Release].
39. See EIOPA Press Release, supra note 38.
40. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Access to the Activity of Credit
Institutions and the Prudential Supervision of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms and Amending Directive
2002/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Supplementary Supervision of Credit Institutions,
Insurance Undertakings and Investment Firms in a Financial Conglomerate, COM (2011) 453 final, (July 7, 2011),
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:201 1:0453:FIN:EN:PDF; see also
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Prudential Requirements for Credit
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work into new regulatory capital and liquidity ratios for European banks, which will also
have an impact on securitization.
The formulation of higher capital charges to ensure the soundness of the financial sys-
tem has been the subject of much debate. With an estimated EUR 1.0 trillion of debt due
for refinancing over the next two years and bond investors increasingly wary of lending to
banks with large sovereign exposures, the securitization markets could be a crucial source
of funds for European financial institutions.41 Whether increased capital requirements for
securitizations together with the requirements of Article 122a will impede or promote
investment remains to be seen.
IV. Japan and China*
A. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PROSPECTS
1. Japan
The revelations of accounting fraud and other irregularities involving suspect payments
and write downs of US$1 billion or more at Olympus Corp. that surfaced in the fall of
2011 have yet to be investigated and resolved. Yet one fact stands out: the revelations and
the ensuing controversy highlight corporate and official Japan's continuing struggle to
improve the corporate governance of public companies. The key question for corporate
Japan, and indirectly for foreign investors, is whether the Olympus scandal will be the one
that finally brings better corporate governance of the kind that will sustain international
confidence in Japan's capital markets and corporations. Perhaps the more important as-
pect of the Olympus scandal is not the alleged wrongdoing per se, which is not too dissim-
ilar from that found in other countries (i.e., misleading accounting skullduggery). What is
more revealing is the tepid official response, or in some views, the lack thereof. This is
not to say that Japan does not have the legal and regulatory framework to deal with corpo-
rate governance problems-it does. After the Enron and WorldCom scandals and the
subsequent adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley regime in the United States, Japan instituted
similar requirements for public companies (commonly referred to as J-SOX).42 What the
Olympus situation highlights for foreign investors is the questionable enforcement and
adequacy of the existing corporate governance framework in Japan. Fortunately, the issue
of stronger corporate governance is, in theory, a policy issue that the Japanese government
is concerned about.43 In that regard, in 2010, the Ministry of Justice convened a Legisla-
Institutions and Investment Firms, COM (2011) 452 final, (July 7, 2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=SPLITCOM:2011:0452(01):FIN:EN:PDF.
41. See Press Release, Association for Financial Markets in Europe, Europe Needs an Expanded Securitiza-
tion Market, says AFME Chief Executive (June 14, 2011), http://www.afine.eu/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.
aspxid=5440.
* Piyasena C. Perera, Anderson Mori & Tomotsune in cooperation with Victor Ho and. Carol Niu of
Allen & Overy.
42. Kin'yu shohin torihiki-ho [Financial Instruments and Exchange Act], Law No. 48 of 1948, art. 24 (4),
art. 193-2 (2) (amended Apr. 1, 2008) (Japan), available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/fie0l/pdf.
43. See MINISTRY OF ECONOMY, TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STUDY
GROUP REPORT (June 17, 2009), http://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/downloadfiles/200906cgst.pdf; see also
Press Release, Financial Services Agency, Remarks by Shozaburo Jimi Minister of State for Financial Services
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/conference/minister/2011/201 1111 1-1.html.
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tive Advisory Council with the authority to consider amendments to Japan's Companies
Act,44 which would strengthen corporate governance in listed companies in Japan. 4" The
Council's Companies Act Subcommittee is currently deliberating amendments to the
Companies Act that would clarify and strengthen the role of "independent outside direc-
tors." This is a good start, but the review should include a serious look at other areas
including: stronger delisting rules at the Tokyo Stock Exchange, increasing personnel at
regulatory agencies like the Securities Exchange Surveillance Commission, and develop-
ing more robust disclosure requirements for related party and M&A transactions. While
none of the above-individually or together-constitutes an ironclad framework to pre-
vent future corporate misdeeds, it will go a long way in improving corporate governance
in Japan and providing comfort to investors.
B. CHINA
In 2011 there were several episodes of problematic or lax corporate governance in
China that, at least from the perspective of Western investors, may serve as a wakeup call
for improved corporate governance in listed companies with operations in China. Specifi-
cally, there have been a number of accounting scandals involving China based public com-
panies that have listed in the United States either through a "reverse merger" structure
(e.g., China Agritech, Sino Forest) or via more traditional IPO methods (e.g., Longtop
Financial). These incidents raise a number of issues for Western investors, including is-
sues of adequate internal controls and adequate audit fuictions within these companies. A
different issue, the lack of transparency and the relative powerlessness of foreign share-
holders, was highlighted in an episode involving the Alibaba Group's transfer of its Alipay
subsidiary to a related party, allegedly without the prior consent of its largest shareholder,
Yahoo! Inc. The above incidents highlight the need for a stronger regulatory framework
for corporate governance in China. There has yet to be an overt effort on the part of
Chinese regulators to improve the quality of corporate governance in China based public
companies; but if Chinese companies want to maintain their attractiveness to foreign in-
vestors, there should be. Predictably, the initial official response has come from regula-
tors in the United States and elsewhere. With respect to the reverse merger companies,
U.S. and Canadian regulators, including the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) and the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) have taken
enforcement action on many of these cases and adopted new rules to try to deal with the
problem.46 The PCAOB is also investigating the use of "variable interest entities" (VIEs)
44. See Kigyo Wa Ho [The Companies Act], Law No.86 of 2005 (as amended), available at http://
www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/horei/data/CAI 4.pdf (apan).
45. See, e.g., Glass Lewis & Co., Japanese Corporate Governance in Progress, WORLD GovE RNANCE FOCUS
Oct. 2010, at 5, available at http://www.glasslewis.com/downloads/1412-183pdf.
46. On November 8, 2011, the SEC approved new rules proposed by the New York Stock Exchange, the
NASDAQ Stock Market and NYSE Amex that tighten the initial listing requirements for reverse merger
companies. See SEC Release No.34-65708, WL 5434020 (Nov. 8, 2011); Exchange Act Release No. 34-
65709, 2011 WL 5434021 (Nov. 8, 2011); Exchange Act Release No. 34-65710, 2011 WL 5455963 (Nov. 10,
2011); see also PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), Research Note No.201 1-Pi,
ACTIVITY SUMMARY AND Auorr IMPLICATIONS FOR REVERSE MERGERS INVOLVING COMPANIES FROM
THE CHiNA REGION: JANUARY 1, 2007 THROUGH MARCH 31, 2010 (Mar. 14, 2011), available at http://
pcaobus.org/Research/Documents/Chinese-Reverse_Merger_Research_Note.pdf.
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by China based public companies. 47 The SEC's equivalent in China, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), has not taken enforcement action to date.
The recent dispute between Alibaba and Yahoo! highlights one of the corporate govern-
ance risks inherent in the popular VIE structure for foreign investment in Chinese compa-
nies. In general, a VIE structure involves an arrangement whereby one or more foreign
investors, together with one or more PRC persons or entities, form an offshore entity
(HoldCo) that owns or controls an onshore wholly foreign owned enterprise (WFOE) or
a similar foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) in China. The WFOE or FIE has contractual
control over the ownership and management of a domestic operating company (OpCo),
which holds the necessary licenses or permits to operate in a business that is subject to
restrictions on foreign investment. The critical feature and perhaps flaw in VIE structures
from a corporate governance perspective is that control over the OpCo is maintained
through voting proxies, equity pledges, and various service agreements rather than
through direct share ownership. This flaw was highlighted in the Yahoo! dispute with
Alibaba. While the actual reasons for the Alipay spin-off remain unknown to the general
public, the validity and the appropriateness of the use of VIE structures has been brought
into question. There have been numerous situations in addition to the Alibaba case,
wherein foreign investors in VIE structures have not been able to control the actual busi-
ness, notwithstanding their level of share ownership or board representation on the
WFOE or FIE. One significant problem is that the VIE structure does not have any
official backing by the Chinese government as a legal structure, which precludes official
redress. The CSRC and other government entities may be considering the appropriate-
ness of VIEs for foreign investment. A serious look at the nature of these structures by the
relevant authorities in China would be beneficial to foreign investors and the advance of
corporate governance in China based public companies.
V. Germany*
A. DISCLOSURE OF EQUITY DERIVATIVES
The Act for the Strengthening of Investor Protection and the Improvement of Capital
Market Efficiency48 will enhance the disclosure of equity derivatives relating to shares of
listed companies and is expected to make secret stake-building in listed companies more
difficult.4 9 The new rules take effect on February 1, 2012, and will introduce disclosure (i)
of instruments "making it possible" for their holder to acquire shares, 50 and (ii) of return
47. See PCAOB, STAFF AUDIT PRACTICE ALERT No.8: AUDIT RISKS IN CERTAIN EMERGENCY MARKErs
6 (Oct.3, 2011), available at http://pcaobus.org/Standards/QandA/201 1-10-03_APA.8.pdf.
* By Dipl.-Kfm. Dr. Hartmut Krause, LL.M., partner of Allen & Overy LLP (Frankfurt, Germany).
48. Gesetz zur Stfrkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funktionsfihigkeit des Kapitalmarkts
[The Act for Strengthening of Investor Protection and the Improvement of Capital Efficiency] Apr. 5, 2011,
BGBL. I at 538 (Ger.).
49. Harmut Krause, Die erweiterte Beteiligungstransparenz bei b)rsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften [The Ex-
tended Participation of Transperency in Listed Companies], 56 DIE AkFIENGEStLLSCHAF-r, 469, 484 (2011)
(Ger.).
50. Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], at 2708, § 25a last amended by Gesetz [G],
Dec. 22, 2011, BDGL. I at 3044 (Get.).
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claims under securities loans and repurchase claims under repo transactions. 51 Therefore,
disclosure will extend to (i) cash-settled instruments if the counterparty can hedge its risks
under the instruments by holding the relevant shares, 52 and (ii) instruments providing for
physical settlement even if they do not confer the right to unilaterally acquire shares. 5 3
The latter include physical call options subject to a condition beyond the control of the
holder of the instrument, or physical put options. Disclosure is required if the underlying
reaches or exceeds (or falls below) five, ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five, thirty, fifty, or
seventy-five percent of the share capital. The hypothetical voting rights under such in-
struments shall be aggregated with the voting rights that are disclosable under current
legislation.
54
As a counterweight to the broad and sweeping disclosure requirements, the Federal
Ministry of Finance was given authority to decree exceptions. 55 Exceptions appear to be
necessary to eliminate irrelevant disclosures resulting from derivatives on baskets and indi-
ces or from hedging transactions incurred by financial service providers when closing
open positions incurred for the benefit of their customers. 56 As the Ministry has not made
use of such authority, it remains to be seen whether the rules in the statute master the
challenge of bringing hidden ownership to light and filtering away all irrelevant
disclosures.
B. REGULATION AFFECTING INVESTMENT FUNDS
The Act for the Transformation of Directive 2009/65/EC, the Co-ordination of Legal
and Administrative Provisions Affecting Undertakings for Collective Investment in Trans-
ferable Securities5 7 tightened the requirements for the management of assets5S and for
sales prospectuses,59 and introduced a framework for (i) collective portfolio management
to work cross-border on the basis of a "European Passport," 60 (ii) the cross-border merger
of investment funds,61 (iii) "master-feeder structures," 62 and (iv) new requirements aiming
at the better information of investors.63 The Act also introduced rules dealing with the
amendment of the contractual terms of investment funds. 6-
51. According to the materials; see Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen und Protokolle [BT] 17/3628, at
19; see also Harmut Krause, supra note 49, at 475.
52. WpHG § 25a (1), sentence 2, no. 1.
53. Id. § 25a (1) sentence 2, no. 2.
54. Id. § 25a (1) sentence 6.
55. Id. § 25a (4) sentence 1, no. 2.
56. Krause, supra note 49, at 478, 482.
57. Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie 2009/65/EG zur Koordinierung der Rechts - und Verwaltung-
svorschriften betreffend bestimmte Organismen fdr gemeinsame Anlagen in Wertpapieren [Act for the
Transformation of Directive 2009/65/EC, the Coordination of Legal and Administrative Provisions Affecting
Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities], June 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 1126 (Ger.).
58. Investmentgesetz [InvG] [Investment Act] Dec. 15, 2003, BGBL. I at 2676, §§ 9(3a)-(3b), 9a(1) no.
7-9, 36(2), last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22, 2011, BGBL. I at 3044.
59. Id. § 42(1), (la).
60. Id. §§ 12a-13a.
61. Id. §§ 40-40h.
62. Id. §§ 45a-45g.
63. Id. § 42(2).
64. Id. § 43(3).
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C. REGULATION OF THE "GREY MARKET"
The draft Act on the Investment of Assets65 will introduce new requirements for invest-
ments in non-listed financial instruments (also known as the "grey market"). Once
promulgated, the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) will check not only the
completeness but also the coherence and comprehensibility of sales prospectuses. 66 Fees
and costs must be disclosed in the sales prospectus in a conspicuous manner.67 Grey capi-
tal markets products will be included in the definition of financial instruments in the Se-
curities Trading Act,68 with the result that business enterprises carrying on the
distribution of, and certain other activities in connection with, grey capital market prod-
ucts will be subject to the organizational requirements applicable to securities services
providers, including the prohibition of "kick-back" payments. 69 Furthermore, the period
of limitation for prospectus liability claims will be extended from six months to two
years. 70 When the manuscript was completed, the draft legislation was still pending in the
Reconciliation Committee of the German Federal Parliament because the upper and the
lower houses failed to agree on whether businesses carrying on activities in connection
with grey capital market products should be supervised by BaFin or by the relevant au-
thorities of the federal states.
VI. Peru*
In addition to the global economic crisis factor, the local political scenario also im-
pacted the performance of the Peruvian capital markets sector. On June 5, 2011, Ollanta
Humala, a left-wing former military officer, won Peru's presidential election, causing an
immediate holdback on private investment. Notwithstanding, investors' confidence is
slowly being restored following Humala's initial hints that his government will not deviate
from existing macroeconomic policies. The appointment of independent and reputable
technocrats as heads of two of the key institutions for Peruvian economy: Julio Velarde,
who was ratified as chief officer of the Central Bank, and Luis Miguel Castilla, the current
Peruvian Minister of Economy, contributed to boost market confidence.
65. DEUTSCHER BUNDESTAG: DRUCKSACHEN UND PROTOKOLLE [BT] 17/7453 (Ger.) (Verm6gen-
sanlagengesetz [Investment Law], adopted by the German Federal Parliament on Oct. 27, 2011).
66. Verordnung ilber Vermbgensanlagen-Verkaufsprospekte [VermVerkProspV] [Securities Prospectus
Regulation] Dec. 16, 2004, BGBL. I at 3463, § 8 (1), last amended by Gesetz [GI, Dec. 6, 2011, BGBL. I at
2481.
67. Id. § 4 (10)-(12). VermVerkProspV should be interpreted in connection with definitions provided in
WpHG § 2. WpHG, Sept. 9, 1998, BGBL. I § 2(3), (4), and (2b), last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 22,2011,
BGBL. I at 3044.
68. WpHG § 2(2b), as amended.
69. WpHG § 31d(l). This section should be interpreted in connection with definitions provided in
WpHG § 2(3), (4), and (2b).
70. Gesetz iiber Verm6gensanlagen [VermAnlGl [Investment of Assets Act], Dec. 6, 2011, BGBL. I at
2481, §§ 20 (1), 21 (1).
* By Jean Paul Chabaneix of Rodrigo, Elfas & Medrano Abogados.
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A number of legal developments are of note regarding Peruvian capital markets sector.
First, Law No. 2972071 (Law that Promotes the Issuance of Securities and Reinforces the
Capital Market) has introduced several changes to the applicable Peruvian legal frame-
work. Among the most relevant ones, we deem important to highlight the following:
" Law No. 29720 sets forth the objective liability of the management of a public
company for the damages caused as a result of the transactions in which it was
involved. Consequently, it will not be necessary to prove negligence of the man-
agement in order to declare its liability for such damages before the company or
its shareholders.
" The companies that do not fall under the supervision of the Superintendency of
the Securities Market (SMV) (i.e., private companies) and meet an annual sales
income or have assets that equal or exceed 3,000 UIT,72 are now obliged to pre-
sent audited financial statements before the SMV. According to Law No. 29720,
such financial information is publicly accessible.
Given that this measure is highly questionable, on November 9, 2011, the Committee
of Economy of the Peruvian Congress approved, by majority, an opinion in favor of modi-
fying the aforementioned rule by suppressing the public access of these financial state-
ments. But it is uncertain if the Peruvian Congress will finally issue a law in such sense.
According to the former regulations of securities private placement, in order to avoid
the qualification of a "public offering," the issuer was prevented from using mass media
while advertising its offer. This requirement has been abrogated by Law No. 29720,
which has, therefore, set forth the following "safe harbors" for private placements: (i) the
offering of securities to "institutional investors,"73 (ii) the offering of securities which low-
est placement or nominal value equals or exceeds PEN 409,342.16,74 and (iii) whenever
the SM expressly provides so.
Second, Law No. 2978275 (Law of Reinforcement of the Capital Markets Supervision)
turned the Business and Securities National Supervisory Commission (CONASEV) into a
Superintendency (the SMV), in an attempt to strengthen its supervisory role over the
agents within the scope of capital markets regulations. In such sense, Law No. 29782 has,
among others: (i) granted technical, administrative and budgetary autonomy to the SMV,
(ii) enabled the SMV to issue periodic penalty payments, (iii) abrogated the limit applica-
ble to the fines issued by the SMV of ten percent of the annual income of the sanctioned
company/person, (iv) reinforced the consolidated supervision of business and financial
71. Ley No. 29720, Ley Que Promueve Las Emisiones de Valores Mobiliarios Y Fortalece El Mercado de
Capitales [Law That Promotes the Issuance of Securities and Reinforces the Capital Market], EL PERJANO,
June 25, 2011.
72. UIT stands for UnidadImpositiva Tributaria, a tax reference unit. For the 2011 fiscal year, the ULIT in
force is PEN 3,600. See Decreto Suprema No. 252-2010-Ef, Valor de la Unidad Impositiva Tributaria du-
rante el ano 2011 [Value of the Tax Unit in 2011], Sistema Peruano de Informacion Juridica, Economica y
Finanzas, Dec. 11, 2010.
73. The qualification of an "institutional investor" falls upon, among others, the following entities: banks,
financial institutions, insurance companies, brokerage firms, open-ended/close-ended investment fund man-
agers and foreign entities that perform similar businesses.
74. This amount is updated annually using the "Wholesale Price Index for Metropolitan Lima." See IN-
sTITLFO NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA E INFORMATICA, INDICADORES DE PRECIOS DC LAW ECONOMIA, No.
02-2011-MnEI (2011).
75. Ley No. 29782, Ley de Fortalecimiento de la Supervision del Mercado de Valores [Law of Reinforce-
ments of the Capital Markets Supervision], EL PERUANO, July 28, 2011.
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groups, and (v) "shielded" public officers of the SMV by subordinating the criminal com-
plaints filed against them to the prior issuance of a technical report from the SMV.
Finally, although it does not exclusively concern the Peruvian capital markets sector,
the official launching of the Integrated Latin America Market (Mercado Integrado Lati-
noamericano, "MILA") on May 30, 2011 constitutes a joint achievement of the stock ex-
changes from Peru, Chile, and Colombia. The MILA is a platform that enables the
trading of equity securities quoted indistinctively on the Lima Stock Exchange, the Santi-
ago Stock Exchange, or the Colombia Stock Exchange; thus, providing a wider range of
investment opportunities for local agents and financing sources for public companies. Al-
though, to date, the trading volumes of the MILA remain on a low average, experts agree
that the future growth of this market seems quite auspicious.
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